Investors traditionally rely on credit ratings to price debt instruments. However, rating agencies are known to be prudent in their approach to rating revisions, which results in delayed ratings adjustments to mutating credit conditions. For a large set of eurobonds we derive credit spread implied ratings and compare them with the ratings issued by rating agencies. Our results indicate that spread implied ratings often anticipate future movement of agency ratings and hence could help track credit risk in a more timely manner. This finding has important implications for risk managers in banks who, under the new Basel 2 regulations, have to rely more on credit ratings for capital allocation purposes, and for portfolio managers who face rating-related investment restrictions.
Introduction

Background
Credit ratings produced by agencies such as S&P and Moody's are widely regarded as an important indicator of creditworthiness by investors in credit markets. They are also an essential input to many credit risk models, such as the pricing model proposed by Jarrow et al. (1997) and CreditMetrics TM , the portfolio credit risk model introduced by JP Morgan (see Gupton et al., 1997) . Under US regulation, the ratings of recognised rating agencies (NRSRO 1 ) are used to assess the value of securities held by securities firms and the amount of capital they must hold. Many institutional investors, such as pension funds, have restrictions on the proportion of their holdings that can be allocated to investment and speculative grade securities. More recently, the New Basel Accord (Basel, 2004) incorporates credit ratings to assess the adequacy of banks' capital. Changes in rating have important implications for various market participants, since they can affect the issuer's cost of capital, credit spreads, bond returns, and the prices and hedge ratios of credit derivatives.
Despite their vast popularity, credit ratings have some weaknesses. One of the major criticisms often being raised is their "stickiness", that is their inability to adjust promptly to changes in risk. For example, when the South-East Asian crisis hit in 1997 rating agencies were blamed for misrepresenting the financial strength of the countries involved, since ratings were downgraded only after the onset of the crisis (see Ferri et al., 1999) .
Several recent high profile default events, such as Enron and Worldcom, also highlight this problem. In Enron's case, the company filed for bankruptcy on 2 nd December 2001, but on 1st November 2001, it was still rated as BBB by S&P. Major credit rating agencies did not downgrade it to junk status until 28 November 2001, only four days before default.
In answer to this criticism, rating agencies argue that since rating changes can have substantial economic consequences for a wide variety of market participants, their policy is to provide stable measures of relative credit risk. A rating is changed only when the issuer's creditworthiness has changed and the change is unlikely to be reversed in a short period of time. Inevitably, there is a tradeoff between accuracy and stability. And, according to rating agencies, some short-term accuracy, the so-called "early warning power", may be sacrificed for stability (see Moody's, 2003) . Nevertheless, investors need an indicator that can provide a timely assessment of credit risk.
An alternative way to measure credit risk is to derive "implied ratings" 2 from the market price of traded instruments. One type of such indicators can be obtained from equity prices. Moody's KMV for example, following Merton (1974) produce expected default frequencies (EDFs) by modelling the equity price of a firm as a call option on the firm's assets. Alternative indicators are bond spread implied ratings recently introduced by Barra and Moody's (see Breger et al., 2002 and Moody's, 2003) . The idea is to derive implied ratings by mapping individual bond spreads to the prevailing spread levels of various rating categories.
In this work, we derive yield spread implied ratings for a large sample of eurobonds and study the lead-lag relationship between spread implied ratings (abbreviated as SIRs hereafter) and agency ratings (ARs hereafter). This work contributes to the existing literature in several respects. First, we conduct a systematic analysis on the lead-lag relationship between SIRs and ARs. Our study shows that SIRs can be used to predict the future movements of ARs. Several researchers have compared the lead-lag relationship between agency ratings and market implied measures (see, Kealhofer, 2003 and Breger et al., 2002) . However, they commonly use individual event studies to illustrate this effect. In this paper, we use a large dataset to carry out systematic tests on whether implied ratings lead agency ratings. The comparison is conducted separately for S&P and Moody's ratings to account for differences that may be present in their rating process.
Our statistical analysis shows that the rating upgrades and downgrades of both agencies can be anticipated by spread-implied ratings. This effect is statistically significant up to six months before the agencies' rating actions. Specifically, we show that spread-implied ratings have predicting power for the agency rating changes around the boundary between investment-grade and speculative-grade, which may be useful to investors subject to rating based portfolio restrictions. For example, many pension funds are only allowed to hold bonds with an investment-grade rating. By monitoring spread-implied ratings, it would be possible to implement an early warning system that predicts agency rating movements.
In a similar study, Hull et al. (2002) examine the relationship between Credit Default Swap (CDS) spreads and Moody's rating events and find that changes in CDS spreads tend to anticipate negative rating announcements, while for positive rating events the results are much less significant. In contrast, our study suggests that spread implied ratings significantly lead agency ratings in both upgrade and downgrade scenarios.
Our other contributions are that we refine the approach to derive SIRs introduced in Breger et al. (2002) . The mapping procedure for the derivation of spread implied ratings requires an estimate of the spread boundaries between adjacent rating categories. Breger et al. (2002) propose an intuitive optimisation procedure to estimate the spread boundaries. However, they do not account for the term structure effect of yield spreads, which may potentially affect the precision of implied ratings In this work, we take into consideration term structure effects by estimating separate boundaries for different maturity bands. Also, we use a rolling window technique to estimate daily spread boundaries, which can then adjust to reflect time-varying spread levels across the business cycle.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the data. In Section 3 we explain how SIRs are derived. Section 4 investigates the lead-lag relationship between SIRs and ARs. Section 5 concludes the paper.
The Data
The data used in this study are 4,183 bond issues (79% of which are eurobonds) collected from Reuters 3,000
Fixed Income Database. The data span 11 years from January 1988 to March 1998. These bonds are selected using the following criteria: fixed coupon rate and repaid at par, principal and coupon payments must be in the same currency, no option or convertibility features and no sinking fund. The information contained in the database includes issue date, dated date,3 maturity date, coupon rate, seniority, currency, industry, daily price history and rating history. The price data are daily "Reuters composite" bid prices that correspond to the best bid reported at the close of trading by a market maker from which Reuters have a data feed. {Graph 1 Graph 2 here} Eurobonds usually carry high credit ratings.4 Issues rated A and above account for over 90% of the total.
Graph 1 is a plot of the credit rating distribution of issues over the sample period. The average maturity of these bonds is 6.4 years. As shown in Graph 2, the majority of the bonds have a maturity between 2 and 10 years, while issues with time to maturity longer than 10 years only account for 3% of the total. 3 The dated date is the date from which a bond begins to accrue interest. 4 High-yield eurobonds started to appear only in the late '90s. The first benchmark was issued in 1997 (see Munves 2003) .
{Table 1 here} Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics of our sample. Eurobonds are typically unsecured instruments. As shown in Panel A, among the 4,183 bonds we used for the analysis, 57.4% are unsecured and 10.2% are senior unsecured. The dataset consists of bonds denominated in 9 major currencies, among which 33% are US dollar-denominated. Issuers of these bonds come from 46 countries, 72.7% of them are banks or other financial institutions.
Spread implied ratings
The yield spread between a corporate and a government bond reflect several factors. First, corporate bond investors require a higher return as compensation for the risk of default. Yield spreads are negatively correlated with credit quality. As bonds with lower credit ratings have higher default probability, their yield spreads are usually higher. Numerous researchers have documented the correlation between agency ratings and yield spreads (see, for example, Ederington et al. 1987 , Kao and Wu 1990 , Hand et al. 1992 , Altman 1997 , Kliger and Sarig 2000 , Cunningham et al. 2001 and Perraudin and Taylor 2003 . The relationship between credit ratings and yield spreads is also explicitly modelled in reduced-form pricing models such as Jarrow et al. (1997) and Lando (1998) .
Yield spreads also reflect the relative liquidity of corporate and treasury securities. Perraudin and Taylor Other factors that affect the yield spread include a tax premium, which reflects the differential tax treatment of interest income of corporate and government bonds; and a risk premium, since the return on corporate bonds is riskier than the return on government bonds and a large part of the risk is non-diversifiable. The tax premium and risk premium of corporate bonds have been studied by Elton et al. (2002) .
The first difficulty that one faces when deriving spread implied ratings is to define the spread range that identifies each SIR. Once spread boundaries are in place at a particular point in time, a specific SIR would be assigned to all bonds whose spread is within the given boundaries at that time. The simplest solution would be to create equal width spread ranges. So for example, bonds with a spread from 0 to 45 basis points (b.p.) would be assigned to the first SIR class, bonds with a spread from 45 to 90 b.p. to the second and so on.
However, this solution would make it difficult to compare ARs and SIRs and study their lead-lag relationship because the spread distribution of bonds within a particular AR varies considerably among rating categories. This is the reason that we take "typical" AR spread ranges to define SIR ranges. For example, if we observe that over the last two-months AAA bonds typically carry a spread of 0~45 basis points and AA bonds usually carry a spread of 45~75 basis points, any bonds whose spread is less than 45 bps could be assigned an implied-rating of AAA, and those with spread between 45bp and 75bp could be given an implied-rating of AA. However, the difficulty with this approach is that the yield spreads of bonds in different rating categories often overlap. 5 For example, single-A issues may trade at a higher spread than BBB issues, and it is not uncommon for the spread of some junk bonds to be lower than that of investment-grade issues. To overcome this difficulty, a criterion is needed to set an appropriate boundary between say, AAA bond spreads and AA bond spreads. Moody's and Barra use different methods to deal with this point. 6 To estimate spread implied ratings we adopt the method introduced by Breger et al. (2002) . For each rating category, we create a penalty function that depends on the position of spread boundaries. The penalty value will increase when a bond's yield spread is outside the upper or lower boundaries corresponding to its credit rating (i.e., when the bond's implied rating is different from its agency rating). The penalty function for the boundary between any two adjacent rating categories, say A and BBB, is defined as follows:
Where refers to the spread of bond i with a single-A agency rating, m is the total number of bonds currently rated single-A, refers to the spread of a bond with a BBB agency rating, n is the total number of bonds currently rated BBB, and b is the spread boundary between A and BBB. The optimum boundaries will be the ones that minimize the penalty function for each rating class. Appendix I provides an example of how this optimisation works.
After obtaining the optimum spread boundaries, a mapping procedure can be employed to derive implied ratings. Issues within the estimated spread region for a certain agency rating will be given an implied rating equal to that agency rating. In other words, an issue traded with a spread level typical for A-rated issues will have an implied-rating of A, even if its actual agency rating is different. Indeed, often there are inconsistencies between a bond's agency rating (which reflects rating agencies' judgement of risk) and its market price (which reflects the risk perceived by the market) in which case the implied and agency rating will differ. This is the case especially in the period immediately before a bond's rating migration, when the bond's spread may already have crossed the boundary of another, more appropriate, spread implied rating.
As we have pointed out before, the yield spread of corporate bonds is not solely determined by the default risk premium, but also by the tax, liquidity and market premia. However, the tax premium in our sample should be negligible since our data almost entirely consist of bearer securities. 7 Also, we control for the effect of systematic changes in market-wide liquidity and risk premium by allowing spread boundaries to be time varying.
Data filtering
To obtain SIRs, we first calculate the yield spread between corporate and treasury bonds and filter out noisy data as described below. After that, we estimate the optimum spread boundaries, which is then used to derive SIRs. The first step in the SIR derivation is to use price and cash flow information to work out the daily yield to maturity for the bonds in the database. Then, we calculate the yield spread between our corporate bonds and government bonds. To do this, our approach is the same as Diaz and Navarro (2002) . For each corporate bond and each trading day, we create a hypothetical treasury bond that has the same cash flow structure and maturity date as the corporate bond under consideration. We then price the hypothetical treasury using treasury zero-coupon curves for the same day. The calculated price and future cash flows are employed to work out the yield to maturity of the hypothetical treasury. The yield spread will be the difference in yield to maturity of the corporate bond and the hypothetical treasury bond. The major advantage of this approach is that it matches the duration and convexity of our corporates, thereby avoiding the so-called coupon bias in spread calculation (see Duffee, 1998) . The treasury zero-coupon rates used to price the hypothetical treasuries are obtained from JP Morgan and Bloomberg. These are rates for nine currencies and maturities from 1 to 30 years. For the non-integer maturities, we use linear interpolation of spot rates.
An important concern with corporate bond data is matrix pricing. When a bond does not trade frequently, dealers may price an issue by using simple algorithms or matrices. This problem could also be present in our dataset. 8 In some cases, dirty prices (clean price plus accrued interest) are higher than the face value plus the coupon payment at maturity, which implies negative yields. Also, at times, prices tend to stay at the same level for a very long period. These phenomena usually occur when bonds are close to maturity, 9 as then, they tend to become illiquid. 10 For this reason, we eliminate observations with time to maturity less than one year.
In addition, the following criteria are used to filter out possible errors and outliers. Yield spread observations are ignored whenever (a) the yield spread is negative, (b) the issue is illiquid, that is, there is no price within seven days before and after the current date, (c) outliers occur in the spread time series; 11 (d) incorrect entries in credit rating history, that is, the rating changes but reverts back to its previous level within 5 trading days.
After the filtering process, we are left with around 3 million spread observations. In Graph 3, we take a sample of bonds with maturity between 2 to 10 years from January 1994 to April 1994 and illustrate the distribution of spreads across agency ratings.
{Graph 3 here}
As one should expect, average spreads increase as credit quality declines. In this sample, the mean yield spreads for AAA, AA, A, BBB and junk (BB and below) ratings are 44, 63, 84, 128 and 236 basis points respectively. Unsurprisingly, spreads of lower rating categories exhibit higher volatility. Another important feature of the data is that spreads of different rating groups are clearly overlapping. For example, the spread of some AAA issues are higher than that of BBB issues, and quite a few junk issues trade with a spread lower than that of investment grade bonds.
Boundary setting
8 Although Reuters do not populate price series with matrix data, it may well be the case that the dealers quote matrix prices themselves and feed them into the system. 9 When a bond is nearing maturity, any tiny change in the price will be translated into a large variation in its yield to maturity. Therefore, if the price feed is not very accurate, the yield to maturity can deviate substantially from its true value. 10 Amihud & Mendelson (1991) find that when bonds approach maturity they have already been locked away in investors' portfolios and a large portion of each issue is not readily available for trading. 11 We eliminate large blips in the spread series, that is, one-off deviations from the prevailing spread level by more than 2 standard deviations.
There are two practical issues related to the choice of boundaries. First, empirical evidence indicates that market spread levels fluctuate with the business cycle (see, for example, Van Horne 1998 and Huang and Kong 2003) . During times of recession, credit spreads are expected to increase as firms' profitability declines and investors become more risk averse. This pattern is confirmed by our data, as shown in Graph 4. For example, a 100 bp spread is equivalent to AAA rating in 1991, while in 1995 this is closer to a BBB.
{Graph 4 here} From our data it is possible to look at the term structure effect of credit spreads. 12 As shown in Graph 5, the spread of a 2-year BBB issue can be very different from the spread of a 10-year BBB issue, even though they have the same agency rating. In addition, the term structure of credit spreads is also time varying. For instance, in June 1992, the term structure for BBB and junk issues is strongly downward sloping, with very high short-term spreads; while in April 1997 it is upward sloping.
{Graph 5 here}
We estimate spread boundaries by taking these observations into account. For each trading day, we collect yield spreads during the last two months for all available bonds. We then divide the sample into 5 groups based on their time to maturity, 1 to 2 years, 2 to 3 years, 3 to 5 years, 5 to 10 years, and 10 to 30 years.
Within each maturity band, we pool the spread data into different categories according to their agency ratings.
We solve equation (1) to find the boundaries between adjacent rating categories within each maturity band. 13 Finally, from the optimum spread boundaries, spread implied ratings are inferred.
Boundaries are estimated daily from January 1989 to April 1998. In Graph 6, we illustrate the term structure of boundaries between 1993 and 1998. In this graph, the boundary between any two adjacent rating categories is represented by a surface. The term structures of boundaries between four investment grade categories are generally upward sloping, while the slope of the boundary between BBB and junk often changes sign. With spread boundaries, we can finally infer implied rating histories. As we can see from Graph 7, spread implied ratings are much more volatile than agency ratings, which is consistent with the findings in (1999) . 13 As we have very few observations for ratings below BBB, the convergence of the optimisation procedure is difficult and very unstable. For this reason, we combine all the categories below BBB together as a junk category.
In many cases, we observe that the SIR of a bond is persistently different from its AR, which indicates that the credit risk perceived by the market is different from that assessed by rating agencies. Then, it may be interesting to investigate whether differences between SIRs and ARs are random or whether one type of rating systematically anticipates changes in the other. In the next section, we use our data to test these hypotheses.
Lead-lag relationship between SIR and AR
It is well documented that market prices can anticipate changes in credit qualities (see Grier and Katz 1976 , Weinstein 1977 , Pinches and Singleton 1978 , Hite and Warga 1997 . Indeed, it is not uncommon to observe that an agency rating downgrade or upgrade does not produce the expected adjustment in the price of the affected securities, as if the market has already anticipated the rating migration.
There are many studies that look at the lead-lag relationship between agency ratings and market implied measures. For instance, Moody's KMV, using some high-profile default events, illustrate the early-warning 
Mean difference between SIR and AR prior to AR movements
Having the history of agency ratings for each bond issue in the sample and having derived the bonds' spreadimplied ratings, we are able to compare the behaviour of the two types of ratings over time. In a market with perfect information, agency ratings and spread implied ratings should be consistent with each other. Any inconsistency would suggest that the investors in the market and rating agencies have different opinions on the future performance of individual firms. To test this, whenever we observe a change in agency rating, we look back to see whether this change has already been anticipated in the market by comparing the past history of SIR and AR. For this exercise we transform letter ratings into numerical values, AAA rated issues are given a value of 1, AA, A and BBB become 2, 3 and 4 respectively and BB and below are assigned a value of 5. For each agency rating change, we calculate the average difference between the SIR and AR for various intervals prior to the AR change and check whether the mean of the average differences is significantly different from zero. In case of AR downgrades, if the difference is significantly greater than zero, we can conclude that the SIR leads the agency rating migration. Similarly, SIRs lead agency rating upgrades if the SIR-AR difference is significantly negative. We do this test for rating changes by one and by two or more notches separately.
If the sample size is large, we can test the significance of this mean with the Central Limit Theorem.
According to the Theorem the sample mean X is normally distributed with Here, the null hypothesis is that the mean of the average SIR-AR difference is zero. For the sub-sample of, say, n one-notch downgrades, we compute the average SIR-AR differences , … , and form a group of n adjusted observations 1 X 2 X n X X X i − which by construction have a zero mean. We then sample n times with replacement from the adjusted group and calculate the t-statistic of the sample mean. By repeating the above procedure 10,000 times we can obtain an empirical distribution for the t-statistic under the null hypothesis that the mean of average SIR-AR difference is zero. If the t-statistic for the original (i.e., unadjusted) sample mean exceeds the 99 th percentile of this empirical distribution, we reject the null hypothesis. For the few subsamples when the results are not significant at the 1% confidence level, we provide the 5% confidence level instead.
In out dataset, 2,850 bonds have rating histories by Standard & Poor's, and 4,005 have rating histories by Moody's. We carry out the analysis using S&P and Moody's data separately. The results are presented in Table   2a and 2b. The first column describes the direction and magnitude of agency rating adjustments. The remaining columns show the average difference between spread implied ratings and agency ratings during various time intervals prior to the agency rating adjustment. As we have transformed the letter ratings into numerical values, negative (positive) values mean that the average spread implied rating is better (worse) than the agency rating.
The Table shows that the agency rating adjustments are anticipated by spread implied ratings. The signs of the mean difference between SIR and AR are all consistent with a SIR-lead pattern. For AR upgrades, the mean differences are negative for all time intervals up to 126 trading days (half a calendar year) prior to the rating event, which means that SIRs rise above ARs well before the AR upgrade. For AR downgrades, the mean differences between SIRs and ARs are positive for all time intervals prior to it, which means that SIRs fall below ARs well ahead of AR downgrades. In the case of one-notch AR upgrades/downgrades, the magnitude of SIR-AR mean differences clearly increases when the date of the AR adjustment is approaching, which may indicate that rating agencies feel market pressure and tend to adjust their ratings when market spreads are clearly out of line with current ratings. All the above mean differences are statistically significant. Also, the absolute values of mean differences are larger for bigger agency rating adjustments, implying that larger disparity between SIR and AR are followed by stronger adjustments by rating agencies, as one may expect.
Since many fund managers can only commit part of their holdings to speculative grade securities, it is important to look at the agency ratings' behaviour around the boundary between investment-grade and speculative-grade. We use the popular definition of "fallen angels" (issues whose ratings fall from investment grade to speculative-grade) and "rising stars" (issues whose ratings rise from speculative grade to investment grade) and examine the relationship between SIR and AR prior to their "rising" or "falling". As shown in Panel B of Table 2a , the result remains qualitatively the same. For "rising stars", the mean differences are negative for all time intervals and are significant at a 1% confidence level. For "fallen angels", mean differences are significantly positive for all intervals up to 44 days (2 calendar months) ahead of the AR downgrade.
Using Moody's rating data, we obtain similar results. In Panel A of Table 2b , nearly all of the observations are concentrated around one-notch migrations. Again, the mean differences have the expected sign and are highly significant for all intervals. Results for upgrades by two or more notches are not reported for lack of observations. In the statistics for "rising stars" and "fallen angels" in Panel B, the mean differences for rising stars are negative and statistically significant, which is consistent with a SIR-lead pattern. The mean differences for fallen angels are mixed and not significant.
Overall, the results of our analysis show that SIRs can predict the future movements of ARs. For one-notch AR migrations, where most observations lie, the leading effect is highly significant. The results for various intervals show that SIRs can provide early warnings up to six months before an AR change. In addition, it appears that SIRs are able to predict rating agencies' actions around the boundary between the investmentgrade and speculative-grade, especially for "rising stars".
Convergence analysis
The above analysis reveals that SIRs provide information about future AR movements. However, it does not explain how the SIR changes before the AR migration. Are the two ratings converging or diverging? In fact, we can observe several patterns in the run up to an agency rating adjustment: (1) SIR leading behaviour, when the AR moves towards the SIR, (2) Convergence, when the AR and SIR move towards each other, (3) Divergence, if the AR moves away from the SIR and (4) AR overreaction that occurs when the AR and SIR move in the same direction but the AR overshoots.
These patterns can be identified by using a simple regression. For every AR change, we collect SIRs for n days before the change and estimate the following model, Appendix II illustrates all possible interactions between the SIR and the AR for a given bond. We run this regression for all bond issues whose AR has changed. Our findings are reported in Table 3a and 3b. We only report results for one-notch AR changes since the number of rating migrations by two notches or more is very small. Tables 3a,b here   Table 3a and 3b summarize our findings for S&P and Moody's ratings respectively. Below we comment on results for a 22-day horizon. Conclusions for longer horizons are broadly similar. The spread implied rating leads the S&P (Moody's) rating 60.9% (57.3%) of the times (combined frequency of "SIR leading" and "SIR leading with AR overreaction"), convergence occurs in 7.4% (6.9%) of the cases (combined frequency of "Convergence" and "Convergence with AR overreaction") and the frequency of divergence is around 29.5%
SIR t
(34.3%). For AR upgrades, the spread implied rating leads the agency rating in 76.9% (77.8%) of the times, convergence occurs in 3.9% (5.2%) of the cases and the frequency of divergence is only 18.3% (17.0%).
The interesting pattern that emerges from both rating agencies is that the SIR leading behaviour is stronger for upgrades than for downgrades on short horizons (22 and 44 days before the agency rating event). This suggests that rating agencies act more promptly when downgrading, thus pre-empting, to a degree, the SIR leading behaviour. Also, divergence is much stronger for downgrades (29.5% and 34.3% for S&P and Moody's) than for upgrades (18.3% and 17.0%) at short horizons which indicates that rating agencies often act independently of the market on private information.
Conclusion
We compare the behaviour of spread implied ratings and agency ratings and find that spread implied ratings are able to predict the future movements of agency ratings. We find that when the spread implied rating is persistently different from the agency rating, it is very likely that the agency rating will be adjusted in the direction indicated by the spread implied rating. Both upgrades and downgrades are anticipated by spreadimplied ratings well ahead of the agency rating migration. We also show that spread-implied ratings have predicting power for agencies' actions around the boundary between the investment and speculative grade, which is a useful piece of information for portfolio managers subject to rating based investment constraints.
Finally, we show that rating agencies respond more quickly when credit quality deteriorates than when it improves. Also, they act "against" the market much more often when downgrading.
Appendix I. Optimisation of the penalty function
To illustrate how the penalty function and the optimisation procedure work, we randomly generate two groups of yield spreads as shown in the following where SIR t is the time series of spread implied ratings for n days before an AR change, and t denotes time in days (t=1 is the first day of the n-day period before the AR change and t=n is the day before the change). We can describe how AR and SIR interact with each other by looking at the intercept a and slope coefficient b.
We shall illustrate all possible pattern combinations for AR upgrades. Combinations for AR downgrades can be derived by symmetry.
Consider the case when AR is upgraded from AR 1 to AR 2 . In the following graphs, the bold line denotes the movement in AR, the thin line denotes the movement in SIR.
When the estimated coefficient b is negative and statistically significant at the 5% confidence level, we can identify the following three cases:
. 
Note:
The time intervals denote the various periods (in trading days) before an agency rating change. For example, [-23, -44] refers to the period from 44 days before the agency rating change to 23 days before the agency rating change.
In the main body of the table are the mean difference between SIRs and ARs for different time intervals prior to an AR change, negative values mean that SIRs are better than ARs, and positive values mean that SIRs are worse than ARs.
"*" indicates that the SIR-AR difference is significant at the 5% confidence level, "**" indicates significance at the 1% confidence level.
Parenthetic values are number of observations. 
Parenthetic values are number of observations. Note:
The table reports the behaviour of the SIR before an AR migration. We have a SIR leading pattern when the AR migrates towards the current estimated SIR level. If the AR migrates towards the SIR but beyond the current estimated SIR level we have SIR leading with AR overreaction. Convergence occurs when the two ratings move towards each other (an AR overreaction takes place when the AR overshoots the current estimated SIR level). We have divergence when the AR moves away from the SIR. Finally, the AR overreacts when both ratings move in the same direction but the AR jumps away from the current estimated SIR level. For a graphical illustration of all the cases we refer the reader to Appendix II. The table reports the behaviour of the SIR before an AR migration. We have a SIR leading pattern when the AR migrates towards the current estimated SIR level. If the AR migrates towards the SIR but beyond the current estimated SIR level we have SIR leading with AR overreaction. Convergence occurs when the two ratings move towards each other (an AR overreaction takes place when the AR overshoots the current estimated SIR level). We have divergence when the AR moves away from the SIR. Finally, the AR overreacts when both ratings move in the same direction but the AR jumps away from the current estimated SIR level. For a graphical illustration of all the cases we refer the reader to Appendix II.
